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The maximum operational range of continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols has
shown to be improved by employing high-efficiency forward error correction codes. Typically, the
secret key rate model for such protocols is modified to account for the non-zero word error rate
of such codes. In this paper, we demonstrate that this model is incorrect: Firstly, we show by
example that fixed-rate error correction codes, as currently defined, can exhibit efficiencies greater
than unity. Secondly, we show that using this secret key model combined with greater than unity
efficiency codes, implies that it is possible to achieve a positive secret key over an entanglement
breaking channel - an impossible scenario. We then consider the secret key model from a post-
selection perspective, and examine the implications for key rate if we constrain the forward error
correction codes to operate at low word error rates.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is one of the most ad-
vanced applications of quantum physics and informa-
tion science. It enables the distribution of information-
theoretically secure random key material between two
parties in spatially-separated locations connected by an
unsecured optical link [1].
There are two complementary approaches to quantum
key distribution: discrete variable quantum key distribu-
tion uses single-photon or weak coherent states and single
photon detectors [2], while continuous variable quantum
key distribution (CVQKD) uses coherent or squeezed
states of light and homodyne detectors [3]. Both discrete
and continuous quantum key distribution systems have
been demonstrated (for a review see [4]) and importantly
both the discrete and continuous approaches to quan-
tum key distribution have been proven to be information-
theoretic secure, the latter against collective attacks [5, 6]
and with composable security [7].
Continuous variable quantum key distribution has
gained interest recently because of the potential technol-
ogy advantages it offers that may enable higher secret key
rates. Technological advantages include high-quantum
efficiency homodyne detectors; high-speed commercial-
off-the-shelf optical components and compatibility with
optical network infrastructure.
Originally limited to short distances [8], the operation
range of CVQKD protocols was considerably extended
by employing the reverse reconciliation protocol that ex-
ploits one-way communication, including forward error
correction codes in the error reconciliation post process-
ing step [9]. Low density party check (LDPC) and multi-
edge LDPC (ME-LDPC) codes are examples of high-
efficiency forward error correction codes that have been
employed in CVQKD systems [10–15]. The ME-LDPC
codes in particular exhibit good error correction perfor-
mances at low signal-to-noise (SNR) ratios, making them
suitable for CVQKD applications.
A simple and useful model for the secret key rate of
CVQKD protocols in the case of collective attacks can
derived when one assumes a specific reconciliation proce-
dure. Specifying the reconciliation procedure to be for-
ward error reconciliation, the secret key rate can then be
empirically modeled by [16]
∆I = βIAB − IE (1)
where IE denotes the bound on an eavesdropper’s (Eve’s)
maximum accessible information, IAB denotes the capac-
ity of the channel between the sender (Alice) and the
receiver (Bob), and β denotes the efficiency of reconcili-
ation.
The model for the secret key rate in Eq. (1) is com-
monly used in the literature to compare the performance
of CVQKD protocols under varying conditions, for ex-
ample, different amounts of loss and noise. Importantly,
Eq. (1) assumes that that every codeword of the forward
error correction code is decoded correctly.
Practical applications of ME-LDPC and LDPC codes
inherently exhibit a non-zero word error rate (WER)
[10, 17]. The WER is the rate at which the decoder fails
to decode the correct codewords. Since the adoption of
forward error correction codes in CVQKD systems, the
model of the secret key rate has been subsequently modi-
fied to include the efficiency and WER of the code [10, 15]
∆I = (βIAB − IE)(1− pfail) (2)
where pfail is the rate at which the decoder fails to decode
to a valid codeword. We point out that it is not clear if
this secret key model was formally derived. We also note
that for all error correction schemes there is always a
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2non-zero probability that a valid, but incorrect, codeword
could be returned. I.e. the decoder will fail but will not
know that it has failed. This would not be detected by
Alice and Bob, resulting in an incorrect secret key which
would not be discovered until the key is used. In our
simulations, we have used the true word error rate (as
we have knowledge of the transmitted message so can
detect all failures). In practice, this won’t be possible,
however it it usually assumed that the undetected error
rate is negligible.
In this paper we show that the current key model
Eq. (2) is incorrect. Firstly, we demonstrate that fixed-
rate error correction codes can exhibit efficiencies, β
greater than unity for a range of word error rates. Sec-
ondly, we show that by using the secret key model Eq. (2)
combined with β greater than unity, it is possible to
achieve a positive secret key over an entanglement break-
ing channel. We then consider the secret key model from
a CVQKD post-selection perspective, and also examine
the implications for key rate if we constrain the forward
error correction codes to operate at low word error rates.
FORWARD ERROR CORRECTION CODES
WITH β GREATER THAN UNITY
Since the adoption of forward error correction codes
in CVQKD protocols, the model for secret key rate has
been formulated to account for the non-ideal performance
of the forward error correction coding scheme. The two
sources of this non-ideal performance are 1) the losses
due to mapping a binary error correction code onto a
Gaussian-input channel, and 2) the losses due to the per-
formance of a practical error correction code compared
to the ideal, capacity achieving, error correction code.
It has been shown [18] that entanglement-based
CVQKD protocols are equivalent to so-called prepare-
and-measure CVQKD protocols where Alice transmits
Gaussian modulated coherent states. In the latter case,
if the sender encodes with Gaussian signals, a mapping
protocol can be used to transform the Gaussian symbols
to binary symbols for subsequent error correction. Re-
cent advances have been made on efficient mapping pro-
tocols (for example see [19] and references therein), which
have been shown to be highly efficient for low SNR ra-
tios, typically required for CVQKD protocols [19]. We
denote the efficiency of the mapping protocol, compared
to perfect Gaussian mapping by βMAP. This mapping
efficiency, although important, is not the focus of this
paper.
Following the mapping step, reconciliation is then per-
formed using an error correction code designed for the
binary-input additive Gaussian white noise (BI-AWGN)
channel, in particular LDPC [10, 11] and ME-LDPC
codes [12–15].
The efficiency of the forward error correction code is
calculated according to [10, 13, 16]
βFEC =
R
IAB
(3)
where R = k/n is the rate of the error correction code
that maps a k bit message to an n bit codeword, and IAB
denotes the capacity of the channel between the sender
(Alice) and the receiver (Bob), i.e. the rate of the ideal
capacity-achieving code. The total efficiency of the rec-
onciliation scheme is then
β = βMAPβFEC. (4)
In the remainder of this paper we will assume that
βMAP = 1. Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) we see that
the key rate for a rate R = k/n forward error correction
code operating at a WER of pfail can be calculated as
∆I = (R− IE)(1− pfail). (5)
For LDPC and ME-LDPC codes, the code performance
at a given SNR (where the SNR is determined by the
parameters of the CVQKD protocol model) can be de-
termined theoretically by evaluating the expected per-
formance of an ensemble of infinite length codes with a
particular structure using density evolution [20]. Density
evolution returns the threshold of a rate R code ensemble,
which is the smallest SNR at which the BER, the fraction
of codeword bits remaining in error following decoding,
goes to zero as decoding proceeds. For a given SNR, we
find the highest code rate R with a threshold at or below
that SNR. Then β is [13]
βFEC =
R
IAB(sth)
(6)
where IAB(sth) is the rate of the capacity achieving code
on an AWGN channel with SNR equal to sth. The secret
key rate model with a rate R code with threshold sth is
∆I = R− IE(sth), (7)
where IE(sth) is the bound on the information leaked to
Eve with SNR equal to sth and the WER is zero. By the
definition of the threshold, the code operates at a zero
error rate and consequently R ≤ IAB(sth) follows from
the channel coding theory and so βFEC ≤ 1.
In contrast, for any finite length code, the error rate
is bounded away from zero. Instead, the performance of
finite-length error correction codes can be determined via
simulation to find the error rate curves (BER and WER)
for a particular code as the SNR is varied. Since the error
rate decreases as the SNR is increased, the SNR value at
which a given code will be operated, sop, will depend on
the WER that can be tolerated by the application. Thus
the rate R of the error correction code we can employ on
a given channel will depend on the WER we allow.
3For example, the rate 0.02 code in [13] has a theoret-
ical threshold (found using density evolution) of sth =
0.02865. Consequently,
βFEC =
R
IAB(sth = 0.02865)
=
0.02
0.02038
= 0.981, (8)
and the secret key rate model with SNR s = 0.02865 is
∆I = 0.02− IE(s = 0.02865). (9)
In practice, a length 220 rate 0.02 code operating at an
SNR of s = 0.029 has a WER of 1/3 [13]. Applying
Eq. (3), this gives
βFEC =
R
IAB(sop = 0.029)
=
0.02
0.02062
= 0.97, (10)
The secret key rate model for this code operating at a
WER of 1/3 with SNR s = 0.029 is
∆I = 2/3
(
0.02− IE(s = 0.029)
)
. (11)
If we take the practice of allowing non-zero WERs to
the extreme, it is possible to significantly increase the
rate R we can operate at a given SNR, s to above IAB(s),
or equivalently, to operate at a β above 1. For example,
Fig. 1 shows the finite length performance of a rate 0.02
code with degree-distribution from [13] when the code
length is 105 bits and a maximum of 5, 000 decoder it-
erations are allowed. By allowing a WER of 0.9999, one
can operate with rate 0.02 at an SNR of 0.0258 and thus
βFEC =
R = 0.02
IAB(sop = 0.0258)
=
0.02
0.018374
= 1.09. (12)
The secret key rate model for this code operating at a
WER of 0.9999 with SNR s = 0.0258 is
∆I = 0.00001
(
0.02− IE(0.0258)
)
. (13)
For the same code rate, R, increasing the WER has al-
lowed us to reduce s and thus reduce IE(s). Conse-
quently, the current secret key rate model informs us that
by increasing the WER we are able to increase the range
of s for which the same rate R code can operate.
Also shown in Fig. 1 is the Shannon capacity result
for rate 0.02 codes and we can see that the ME-LDPC
code is in fact operating at an SNR below the Shannon
channel capacity which is why β can be calculated as
greater than 1. Of course this code is not outperforming
the Shannon channel capacity, rather the comparison is
not valid. Coding schemes with a non-zero error rate are
not bound by the same capacity formula as schemes with
a zero error rate. It is well known that the capacity of the
AWGN channel varies as the BER is allowed to increase
[21]. If the BER is below 10−4 the effect is insignificant
[21], however, above this, the SNR required to decode
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FIG. 1. BER (blue solid curve) and WER (blue dashed
curve) for a length 105 rate 0.02, ME-LDPC code with degree
distribution from [13] with a maximum of 5, 000 decoder itera-
tions. Here R is the code rate and s is the channel SNR. Also
shown is the zero-error channel capacity for this code rate
(solid black curve) and the non-zero error channel capacity
for this code rate (dashed black curve).
at the given BER reduces significantly if a non-zero error
rate is allowed. Also shown in Fig. 1 is the non-zero error-
rate capacity. Indeed, if we consider that we are allowed
to operate at error rates as high as we like, the results
in [21] tell us that by operating close to the non-zero-
error-rate capacity we can obtain a very large increase
in SNR over the zero-error-rate capacity and thus obtain
a β >> 1. Fig. 2 shows β results we have obtained in
practice for the code from Fig. 1 as the WER is varied.
In this section we have demonstrated that fixed-rate
forward error correction codes operated at a non-zero
WER can operate at lower SNR than ideal codes
operating at a zero WER, thus returning a β above
unity. Alternatively, if the SNR is fixed, operating the
codes at higher WERs increases the code rate R that
can be used thereby increasing the likelihood that we
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FIG. 2. The values of β, Eq. (3), obtained for the length
105 rate 0.02, multi-edge LDPC code with degree distribution
from [13] with a maximum of 5, 000 decoder iterations.
can obtain a positive (R − IE) term in the secret key
model. In the following section we demonstrate that this
has important consequences for the validity of the key
rate model, as currently defined.
CODES WITH β GREATER THAN UNITY
APPLIED TO UNITY-GAIN CLASSICAL
TELEPORTER QUANTUM CHANNELS
We have demonstrated that is it possible to operate
at a code rate above that of an ideal code by using,
fixed-rate forward error correction codes operating at suf-
ficiently high WERs. We will now describe a problem
that arises with the secret key model in Eq. (2) when
considering codes operating at a non-zero WER.
In quantum information theory, it has been shown that
when a quantum channel is replaced with a classical tele-
porter [22], no entanglement can be transmitted through
such a channel [18].
As a consequence, in the context of quantum key dis-
tribution, no secret key can be established through such
a quantum channel [23]. Such a channel would be equiv-
alent to an intercept-and-resend attack.
A Gaussian quantum channel is completely described
by the channel transmission and the channel excess noise
[9].
In the case where a quantum channel is replaced by
a classical teleporter operating at unitary gain [22], the
quantum channel parameters are described by a trans-
mission T = 1 and a (relative input) excess noise of ε = 2.
From Eq. ((2)), we can see that the secret key model
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FIG. 3. The β required to achieve a positive secret key rate
for a unity-gain classical teleporter quantum channel for var-
ious Gaussian CVQKD protocol configurations: Direct rec-
onciliation (blue) and reverse reconciliation (red); Squeezed
states and homodyne detection (solid line); coherent states
and homodyne detection (dotted line); coherent states and
heterodyne detection (dot-dashed line); squeezed states and
heterodyne detection (dashed line). β is plotted versus Alice’s
transmitted state variance (V ).
is positive when
β >
IE
IAB
, (14)
this is equivalent to R > IE from the previous section.
We can therefore calculate the β required to achieve a
positive rate in the secret key model.
Fig. 3 shows the value of β required to achieve a pos-
itive secret key for the following CVQKD protocols: co-
herent or squeezed state sources; homodyne or hetero-
dyne detection; and direct and reverse reconciliation pro-
tocols (For details see Ref [24]). In Fig. 3, we have as-
sumed collective attacks, asymptotic key lengths, and
ideal detection efficiency. An example of the equations
describing the channel capacity (IAB) and Eve’s max-
imum accessible information (IE) are detailed in Ap-
pendix 1. Fig. 3 plots the required β verses Alice’s trans-
mitted state variance (V = VA + 1), which is the only
free parameter and is normalized to the quantum noise
limit.
Fig. 3 shows that βs only slightly greater than unity
are required to achieve a positive key rate for a number
of Gaussian CVQKD protocols operating over unity-gain
classical teleporter quantum channel. In the previous
section we demonstrated that the secret key rate model
Eq. (1) can lead to greater than unity β. This is in
addition to recent advances in Gaussian to binary
mapping protocols have demonstrated high efficiencies
at low-SNR ratios (For example see Ref [19]). Finally,
we note that greater βFEC values could be obtained by
5operating poorer FEC codes, poorer in the sense of a
slower drop off in error rate with increasing SNR above
capacity, as these codes can also have a slower increase
in error rate with decreasing SNR below capacity.
A DISCUSSION ON THE SECRET KEY RATE
MODEL
In the previous section we demonstrated that the secret
key rate models given by in Eq. (2) and Eq. (5) give
incorrect results when employing fixed-rate forward error
correction and operating over a range of high WERs.
It is logical to reason that the secret key rate models
may then be incorrect for all non-zero WERs. And since
applications of fixed-rate ME-LDPC codes are operated
at quite high WERs, it is logical to conclude that the
secret key model is incorrect when such codes are used
in the the error reconciliation procedure [10–15].
In the following we discuss how the current secret key
rate model may be incorrect.
A CVQKD post-selection perspective
Here we make the observation that the act of choos-
ing which codewords to keep or discard based on their
decoding performance is equivalent to a form of post-
selection. In a general CVQKD post-selection protocol,
Alice and Bob discard a subset of their data in-order to
gain an information advantage over Eve. Likewise, in an
error reconciliation process, Alice and Bob “post-select”
the transmitted words that decoded to correct codewords
and discard those that did not.
A secret key rate model has been proposed in the con-
text of the CVQKD post-selection protocol [25]. The
secret key rate model for a general protocol with post-
selection is [16]
∆IPS = fβIAB − IE (15)
where f is the fraction of post-selected data. This se-
cret key rate model is not known to be tight and can
be treated a pessimistic lower bound [16]. In the for-
ward error correction context, the selected data is the
set of codewords that have been decoded to a valid code-
word and so a failure rate of pfail results in the fraction
f = 1 − pfail of the transmitted codewords being post
selected, which gives a post selection key rate of
∆I ′ = (1− pfail)βIAB − IE. (16)
An interpretation of this model is that all of Eve’s infor-
mation is retained and distilled into remaining key bits
after error correction in the case of the finite failure prob-
ability of the forward error correction system.
We consider the performance of ME-LDPC codes as
the reconciliation step in a CVQKD system as described
in [13, Figure 5] using both the traditional secret key
model Eq. (2) and the post-selection secret key model
Eq. (16).
Fig. 4 shows the secret key models (Eq. (2) and
Eq. (16)) assuming collective attacks and employing re-
verse reconciliation, Gaussian modulated coherent states
and homodyne detection. Both models utilize six ME-
LDPC codes in the reconciliation procedure with perfor-
mance data points (R, s,WER, β) as reported in [13] and
choose the value of signal variance, 1 < VA < 100 cor-
responding to the given SNR, s. In short, we have sim-
ply applied the same six data points from [13] to both
Eq. (2) and Eq. (16) using the same CVQKD parameters
in Ref. [13].
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FIG. 4. Secret key models assuming collective attacks
and employing ME-LDPC codes in the reconciliation
procedure. The CVQKD protocol assumes reverse rec-
onciliation, Gaussian modulated coherent states and
homodyne detection. Same CVQKD parameters as Ref. [13]:
VA ∈ {1, 100} modulation variance; ε = 0.01 relative
input channel excess noise; η = 0.6 homodyne efficiency;
νel = 0.01 detector electronic noise; WER = 1/3. Solid
blue: key rate model Eq. (2), dashed red: key rate model
Eq. (16). From right to left the ME-LDPC code parame-
ters (R, s,WER, β), are [13] (0.005, 0.00725, 0.33, 0.959),
(0.01, 0.0145, 0.33, 0.966), (0.02, 0.029, 0.33, 0.969),
(0.05, 0.075, 0.33, 0.958), (0.1, 0.0.161, 0.33, 0.931) and
(0.5, 1.097, 0.33, 0.936). There is no dashed red curve shown
for the (0.005, 0.00725, 0.33, 0.959) code as the key rate
equation Eq. (16) returns zero key bits for this code.
Fig. 4 shows the impact of a high-WER on both the
secret key rate and operational range of the secret key
model Eq. (16) with a high WER impacts both the se-
cret key rate and operational range of the protocol. This
suggests that it may be better to operate the FEC codes
at a much lower WER to maximize performance.
To examine this further, Fig. 5 shows the effect on the
6key rate calculation for a set of ME-LDPC codes when
we jointly optimized over SNR, WER and code rate. The
CVQKD system is the same as described above for Fig. 4.
We consider ME-LDPC codes with length 105 and rates
0.5, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, and 0.005 with degree distributions
as in [13]. For simplicity, we have assumed zero loss in
efficiency due to Gaussian to binary mapping, have ig-
nored finite length effects in all cases and have not placed
any limitation on VA. To obtain the values for SNR and
WER for each code we simulated their performance on
the BI-AWGN channel over a range of SNRs and WERs
(see Appendix 2 for more detail on the optimization of
the parameters).
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FIG. 5. Secret key models assuming collective attacks and
employing ME-LDPC codes in the reconciliation procedure.
Same CVQKD parameters as Fig. 4. The key rate models
have been optimized over all (R, s,WER, β) points for the six
ME-LDPC codes. The ME-LDPC codes with length 105 bits
and rates 0.5, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01, and 0.005 are constructed
randomly with degree distributions as given in [13]. The dash-
dot black curve gives the key rate for a theoretically optimal
code (β = 1, WER= 0). The solid blue curve gives the key
rate calculated traditionally via Eq. (2) while the dashed red
curve gives the key rate calculated via Eq. (16). See Ap-
pendix 2 for more information on the data used to generate
these curves.
Fig. 5 emphasizes the problem with the secret key
model Eq. (2). For high transmission losses, the opti-
mized key rate corresponds to a high-WER with β above
1. This corresponds to a better key rate than a theoreti-
cally optimal code (β = 1, WER= 0). In contrast, Fig. 5
shows the secret key model Eq. (16). The secret key rate
for this model is optimized at significantly lower WERs
with codes operating at lower β values. We emphasize
that the secret key model Eq. (16) is a conservative model
of the secret key rate.
Operating at low word error rates
Increasing the WER allows us to increase the code rate
R above IAB thereby giving a positive
βIAB − IE = R− IE ,
term even when IAB < IE . The multiplicative correction
term (1−WER) simply scales down the key rate leaving
it positive.
As we showed in Fig. 1, the error rate permitted has a
significant effect on the code rate that can be achieved if
it is allowed to be large. Of interest would be the oper-
ation of the forward error correction codes at error rates
low enough so that the difference between the two cases
is negligible. For ME-LDPC codes this means operat-
ing each code at a lower SNR or equivalently operating
a much lower rate code at the same SNR. As an exam-
ple, Fig. 6 shows the key rate we can obtain by using the
same codes as the previous examples but limiting their
operation to SNRs where the WER is below 0.05. De-
spite still allowing a quite high WER, a significant key
rate loss is observed. This indicates that the high WER
allowed previously played an important role in reporting
good key rates.
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FIG. 6. Secret key models assuming collective attacks and
employing ME-LDPC codes in the reconciliation procedure.
Same CVQKD parameters as Fig. 4. The key rate models
have been optimized over all (R, s,WER, β) points such that
WER < 0.05 for the six ME-LDPC codes. The ME-LDPC
codes with length 100,000 bits and rates 0.5, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02,
0.01, and 0.005 are constructed randomly with degree distri-
butions as given in [13]. The dash-dot black curve gives the
key rate for a theoretically optimal code (β = 1, WER= 0).
The solid red curve gives the key rate calculated traditionally
via Eq. (2).
While it may be possible, through good code design, to
improve the code WER performance of ME-LDPC codes
to some extent, for fixed rate codes there will always be
7a trade-off between operating at a SNR that returns a
good efficiency and operating at an SNR that returns
a low word error rate. Nevertheless, there are alterna-
tive forward error correction strategies that do not use
fixed-rate forward error correction codes. Instead we can
employ so-called rateless Raptor codes that adjust the
code rate in real time so as to always decode to a valid
codeword, returning codes with both low word error rates
and high efficiencies.
Raptor codes are graph based codes formed from the
concatenation of a high rate LDPC code with a Luby
Transform (LT) code. LT codes [26] have very simple
encoding and decoding processes and can approach the
capacity of binary erasure channels with an unknown era-
sure rate. The encoding and decoding of Raptor codes
are linear in terms of the message length; thus practi-
cal for applications with large data transmission. Raptor
codes were studied for AWGN channels in [27], where a
systematic framework was proposed to find the optimal
degree distribution across a range of SNRs. The design
of very low rate Raptor codes was studied in [28]. Us-
ing Raptor codes, a potentially limitless number of coded
symbols can be generated, allowing the receiver to decode
the message once a sufficient number of parity bits have
been received; thus always decoding to a valid codeword.
It has been shown [29] that low-rate Raptor codes can
achieve higher efficiencies in comparison with the fixed
rate ME-LDPC codes in the entire SNR range and do so
at very low WERs. When applied to the reconciliation
step of CVQKD, Raptor codes can significantly improve
the key rate [29]. For example, Figure 7 shows the key
rate of the same CV-QKD system as considered in Fig. 4
applying the Raptor codes from [27, 29] (See Appendix 3
for more detail). For the Raptor codes the two models
Eq. (16) and Eq. (2) return the same key-rate.
A new model
A full solution to this problem is non-trivial because
the model involves finite-size effects (ie imperfect error
correction) and asymptotic quantities. Such a solution
would require a model of the number of bits revealed
during the reconciliation procedure based on the partic-
ular code used, and how this quantity behaves in the
asymptotic limit.
Protocols with a complete security proof in the finite-
size regimes exist, for instance [30]. Such proofs for rec-
onciliation using forward error correction will require a
model of the number of bits leaked during the forward
error correction reconciliation procedure as a function of
the WER, and any uncertainty in it, as well as the code-
word length and measurement errors.
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FIG. 7. Secret key models assuming collective attacks and
employing for Raptor and ME-LDPC codes in the reconcil-
iation procedure. Same CVQKD parameters as Fig. 4. For
both ME-LDPC and Raptor codes, the secret key rate model
has been optimized over the parameters (R, s,WER, β). The
ME-LDPC codes with codeword length n = 105 bits and rates
0.5, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 0.01, and 0.005 are constructed randomly
with degree distributions as given in [13]. The raptor codes
with message length k = 104 are constructed randomly with
degree distributions as given in Appendix 3. The dash-dot
black curve gives the key rate for a theoretically optimal code
(β = 1, WER= 0). Solid green curve: the key rate model for
Raptor codes via Eq. (16). Dashed red curve: key rate model
for ME-LDPC codes via Eq. (16).
CONCLUSION
The maximum operation range of continuous variable
quantum key distribution systems has shown to be im-
proved by employing high-efficiency forward error cor-
rection codes such as ME-LDPC codes. In the current
literature, CVQKD protocols with fixed-rate forward er-
ror correction codes typically use a modified secret key
model Eq. (2) that includes the WER term.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that this secret
key model is incorrect. We demonstrated this in two
steps. Firstly, we showed that previously used ME-LDPC
codes for a range of high word error rates, exhibited effi-
ciencies greater than unity. Secondly, we showed that as-
suming that code efficiencies could be greater than unity,
then using the secret key model Eq. (2), it was possi-
ble to achieve a positive secret key over an entanglement
breaking channel, which is equivalent to an intercept and
resend attack - an impossible scenario. We concluded
that if the secret key model is incorrect for a range of
high WERs, it is also possibly incorrect for any non-zero
WERs.
We subsequently discussed the secret key model from
the perspective of CVQKD post-selection protocols. In a
CVQKD post-selection protocol, Alice and Bob discard
8a subset of their data in-order to gain an information
advantage over Eve. Similarly, in an error reconciliation
process, Alice and Bob “post-select” the code words that
decoded to valid codewords and discard codewords that
they were unable to decode. This secret key rate model is
not known to be tight but can be treated as a lower bound
[16]. We showed that using the post selection key rate
model reduces the previously reported operational range
of such CVQKD systems employing fixed length forward
error correction codes. We also showed that using the
current secret key rate model, but restricting the codes
to operate at lower WERs, can also reduce the previously
reported operational range of CVQKD systems employ-
ing fixed length forward error correction codes. However,
we did show that it is possible to employ an alternative
forward error correction coding solution in the form of
Raptor codes, which provide high efficiencies while oper-
ating at very low WERs.
A full solution to this problem would require a model
of the number of bits revealed during the reconciliation
procedure based on the particular code used, and how
this quantity behaves in the asymptotic limit. Until such
a model is known we would suggest that key rates ob-
tained using the current model while operating at high
WERs may not be accurate.
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APPENDIX 1
In this section we detail Alice and Bob’s channel ca-
pacity as well as Eve’s information for the Gaussian pro-
tocol with reverse reconciliation and employing coherent
states and homodyne detection. Here we assume collec-
tive attacks and asymptotic key lengths. The free param-
eters in these equations are the following: V variance of
the transmitted state; T quantum channel with transmis-
sion; ε relative input channel excess noise; η homodyne
efficiency; νel detector electronic noise. Alice and Bob’s
channel capacity (IAB) and Eve’s information (IE)are de-
scribed by the following compact set of equations [31].
IAB = C =
1
2
log2
(
V + χtot
χtot + 1
)
(17)
V = VA + 1 (18)
χtot = χline + χhom/T (19)
χline = 1/T − 1 + ε (20)
χhom = (1− η + νel)/η (21)
IE = G[(λ1 − 1)/2] +G[(λ2 − 1)/2] (22)
−G[(λ3 − 1)/2]−G[(λ4 − 1)/2] (23)
G[x] = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2(x) (24)
λ1 =
√
1
2
(
A+
√
A2 − 4B
)
(25)
λ2 =
√
1
2
(
A−
√
A2 − 4B
)
(26)
λ3 =
√
1
2
(
C +
√
C2 − 4D
)
(27)
λ4 =
√
1
2
(
C −
√
C2 − 4D
)
(28)
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2 (29)
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2 (30)
C =
Aχhom + V
√
B + T (V + χline)
T (V + χline)
(31)
D =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
T (V + χline)
(32)
(33)
The complete set of Gaussian protocol configurations,
includes: squeezed states and homodyne detection; co-
herent states and heterodyne detection and squeezed
states and heterodyne detection. These protocols are de-
scribed in detail elsewhere [24] in the case of ideal homo-
dyne detector efficiency and ideal forward error correc-
tion codes.
APPENDIX 2
In this section we provide details for optimizing the
secret key rate models shown in Fig. 5. We consider ME-
LDPC codes with length 100,000 and rates 0.5, 0.1, 0.05,
0.02, and 0.005 with degree distributions as in [13]. The
parity-check matrices were constructed randomly subject
to the degree distribution constraints. Fig. 8 shows the
performance of the ME-LDPC codes with rates 0.005,
0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1 as the channel SNR is varied.
We then jointly optimized over SNR, WER and rate to
maximize the secret key rate for each transmission dis-
tance. The final secret key rate is the maximum key rate
over all codes. In Figs. 9 to 12, the solid red curves give
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FIG. 8. WER versus SNR for the considered ME-LDPC
codes From left to right are the ME-LDPC codes with rates
0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1.
the parameters which optimize the key rate calculated via
Eq. (2) while the dashed red curves give the parameters
which optimize the key rate calculated via Eq. (16).
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FIG. 9. Optimized code rate versus distance for key rate
equations Eq. (2) (solid blue) compared to key rate equations
Eq. (16) (dashed red curve)
APPENDIX 3
We consider two Raptor codes in this paper. The first
code, from [28], has degree distribution
Ω(x) = 0.0035x+ 0.3538x2 + 0.2337x3 + 0.0737x4
+ 0.0755x5 + 0.0262x6 + 0.0608x7 + 0.0493x11
+ 0.0255x12 + 0.0002x21 + 0.0454x23
+ 0.0072x57 + 0.0180x58 + 0.0272x300 (34)
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FIG. 10. Optimized SNR versus distance for key rate equa-
tions Eq. (2) (solid blue) compared to key rate equations
Eq. (16) (dashed red curve)
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FIG. 11. Optimized WER versus distance for key rate equa-
tions Eq. (2) (solid blue) compared to key rate equations
Eq. (16) (dashed red curve)
The second Raptor code, from [27], has degree distribu-
tion
Ω(x) = 0.0146x1 + 0.3766x2 + 0.0677x3 + 0.2946x4
+ 0.1291x9 + 0.0060x12 + 0.0341x24 + 0.0228x29
+ 0.0073x43 + 0.0472x200 (35)
See [27, 28] for details on encoding and decoding al-
gorithms for these codes. Figure 13 shows the simulated
efficiency for these codes on an AWGN channel as the
SNR is varied.
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FIG. 12. Optimized β versus distance for key rate equations
Eq. (2) (solid blue) compared to key rate equations Eq. (16)
(dashed red curve)
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FIG. 13. β versus SNR for the two raptor codes. The solid
curve gives β values obtained for the code from [28] with de-
gree distribution (34) and message length k = 100, 000. The
dashed curve gives the efficiency of the code from from [27]
with degree distribution (35) and message length k = 38, 000.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quan-
tum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 74, pp. 145–
195, 2002.
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf,
M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The security
of practical quantum key distribution,” Rev. Mod. Phys.,
vol. 81, pp. 1301–1350, Sep 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/RevModPhys.81.1301
[3] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, N. Cerf,
T. Ralph, J. Shapiro, and S. Lloyd, “Gaussian quantum
information,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 621–
669, 2012.
[4] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, “Secure quantum
key distribution,” Nature Photonics, vol. 8, p. 595604,
2014.
[5] R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n and N. Cerf, “Unconditional optimality
of Gaussian attacks against continuous-variable quantum
key distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 97, p. 190503,
2006.
[6] M. Navascues, F. Grosshans, and A. Acin, “Optimality of
Gaussian attacks in continuous-variable quantum cryp-
tography,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 97, p. 190502, 2006.
[7] A. Leverrier, “Composable security proof for continuous-
variable quantum key distribution with coherent states,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 114, p. 070501, Sep 2008.
[Online]. Available: http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/
PhysRevLett.109.100502
[8] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, “Continuous variable
quantum cryptography using coherent states,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 88, p. 057902, Jan 2002.
[9] F. Grosshans, G. Van Assche, J. Wenger, R. Brouri,
N. Cerf, and P. Grangier, “Quantum key distribution
using Gaussian-modulated cohrent states,” Nature, vol.
421, p. 238, 2003.
[10] J. Lodewyck, M. Bloch, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, S. Fossier,
E. Karpov, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, N. J.
Cerf, R. Tualle-Brouri, S. W. McLaughlin, and
P. Grangier, “Quantum key distribution over 25 km
with an all-fiber continuous-variable system,” Phys. Rev.
A, vol. 76, p. 042305, Oct 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.76.042305
[11] S. Fossier, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, A. Villing,
R. Tualle-Brouri, and P. Grangier, “Field test of a
continuous-variable quantum key distribution proto-
type,” New J. Phys., vol. 11, p. 045023 (14pp), 2009,
doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/4/045023.
[12] A. Leverrier and P. Grangier, “Conditional security proof
of long distance continuous-variable quantum key distri-
bution with discrete modulation,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 102,
p. 180504, 2009.
[13] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, and A. Leverrier, “Long
distance continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution
protocols with a Gaussian modulation,” Phys. Rev. A,
vol. 84, p. 062317, 2011.
[14] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, A. Leverrier, P. Grangier,
and E. Diamanti, “Experimental demonstration of long-
distance continuous-variable quantum key distribution,”
Nature Photon., vol. 7, pp. 378–381, 2013.
[15] D. L. Duan Huang, Peng Huang and G. Zeng, “Long-
distance continuous-variable quantum key distribution
by controlling excess noise,” Scientific Reports, vol. 6,
no. 19201, 2016.
[16] A. Leverrier, “Theoretical study of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution,” 2009, PhD Thesis, ParisTech.
[17] J. Martinez-Mateo, D. Elkouss, and V. Martin, “Key rec-
onciliation for high performance quantum key distribu-
tion,” Scientific Reports, vol. 3, 2013.
[18] F. Grosshans, N. Cerf, P. Grangier, J. Wenger, and
R. Tualle-Brouri, “Virtual entanglement and reconcilia-
tion protocols for quantum cryptography with continuous
variables,” Quantum Inf. Comput., vol. 3, p. 535, 2003.
[19] A. Leverrier, R. Allaume, J. Boutros, G. Zmor, and
P. Grangier, “Multidimensional reconciliation for a
continuous-variable quantum key distribution,” Phys.
Rev. A, vol. 77, p. 042325, 2008.
[20] T. J. Richardson, M. A. Shokrollahi, and R. L. Ur-
banke, “Design of capacity-approaching irregular low-
density parity-check codes,” IEEE Trans. Inform. The-
11
ory, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 619–637, Feb. 2001.
[21] J. P. Aldis, “Capacity of digital communication system
with allowed nonzero error rate,” Electronics Letters,
vol. 28, no. 13, pp. 1252–1253, June 1992.
[22] A. Furusawa, J. L. Sørensen, S. L. Braunstein, C. A.
Fuchs, H. J. Kimble, and E. S. Polzik, “Unconditional
quantum teleportation,” Science, vol. 282, no. 5389, pp.
706–709, 1998.
[23] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Entan-
glement as precondition for secure quantum key distri-
bution,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 92, p. 217903, 2004.
[24] R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, “Quantum information with optical
continuous variables: from bell tests to key distribution,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Universite´ libre de Bruxelles, 2007.
[25] N. L. Ch. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph and G. Leuchs, “Con-
tinuous variable quantum cryptography: Beating the 3
db loss limit,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 89, p. 167901, 2002.
[26] M. Luby, “LT codes,” in Proc. 43rd Annual IEEE Symp.
Foundations Comput. Science, Nov. 2002, pp. 271 – 280.
[27] O. Etesami and A. Shokrollahi, “Raptor codes on binary
memoryless symmetric channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 2033 – 2051, May. 2006.
[28] M. Shirvanimoghaddam and J. S. J., “Raptor codes in
the low SNR regime,” IEEEComms, vol. 64, no. 11, pp.
4449–4460, Nov 2016.
[29] M. Shirvanimoghaddam, S. J. Johnson, and A. M. Lance,
“Design of Raptor codes in the low SNR regime with
applications in quantum key distribution,” in Proc. IEEE
International Communications Conference (ICC), May.
2016, pp. 1–6.
[30] F. Furrer, T. Franz, M. Berta, A. Leverrier, V. B.
Scholz, M. Tomamichel, and R. F. Werner, “Continuous
variable quantum key distribution: Finite-key analysis
of composable security against coherent attacks,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 109, p. 100502, Sep 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/
PhysRevLett.109.100502
[31] S. Fossier, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, R. Tualle-
Brouri, and P. Grainger, “Improvement of continuous-
variable quantum key distribution systems by using op-
tical preamplifiers,” J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. Phys.,
vol. 42, p. 114014, 2009.
